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Abstract 
Language and concepts are intimately linked to each other, but how 
do they interact? Here, we probe the relation between conceptual and 
linguistic processing at the earliest processing stages. We presented 
observers with sequences of visual scenes at 200ms per scene. Results 
show that observers understood and remembered the scenes’ abstract 
gist and, therefore, their conceptual meaning. However, they 
remembered the scenes at least as well when simultaneously 
performing a linguistic secondary task (i.e., reading and retaining 
sentences); in contrast, a nonlinguistic secondary task (equated for 
secondary task difficulty) impaired performance on the scenes. 
Further, encoding scenes interfered with the nonlinguistic secondary 
task and vice-versa, while scene processing and the linguistic 
secondary task did not affect each other. At the earliest stages of 
conceptual processing, the extraction of meaning from visually 
presented linguistic stimuli and of conceptual information from the 
world take place in remarkably independent channels. 
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Early conceptual and linguistic processes operate in independent 
channels 
Language and concepts are intimately linked to each other. For 
example, conceptual real-world knowledge, or even just seeing visual 
arrays of objects, can affect how we initially interpret the grammatical 
structure of sentences that refer to those objects (e.g., Tanenhaus, 
Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995; Trueswell, Tanenhaus, 
& Garnsey, 1994, but see Rayner, Carlson, & Frazier, 1983; Clifton et 
al., 2003). Further, the semantic or conceptual meaning of words can 
even affect low-level perception. For example, when listening to verbs 
describing upward motion, observers are impaired in detecting actual 
downward motion, and vice-versa (e.g., Meteyard, Bahrami, & 
Vigliocco, 2007; for effects of language on visual processes such as 
attention and search, see, among many others, Huettig & Altmann, 
2007; Spivey, Tyler, Eberhard & Tanenhaus, 2001).  
Such results raise the question of whether processes that derive 
meaning from sensory data, be they linguistic or nonlinguistic, rely on 
shared mechanisms that are interdependent at all levels, from the 
lowest levels of, say, motion perception to the highest level of actually 
representing meaning. Different research traditions offer a spectrum 
of positions on this venerable question. Traditions affirming such an 
interdependence include the “Whorfian” view that language 
constrains the concepts and percepts we can entertain (Whorf, 1956), 
and the “embodied”, “simulationist” view that understanding any 
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concept involves mentally simulating its referent (e.g., we might 
understand the meaning of “upward” by mentally simulating what 
upward motion looks like; see e.g. Barsalou, 1999). Other authors 
hold that conceptual and linguistic information are processed by 
completely modular and encapsulated processors (e.g., Fodor, 1983; 
Pylyshyn, 1999). In between, still other authors propose that linguistic 
stimuli are analyzed by dedicated processors, but that these processors 
can also incorporate nonlinguistic information when available 
(Tanenhaus et al., 1995; Trueswell et al., 1994). 
While these results suggest that conceptual and linguistic 
processing interact in important ways, they do not address the 
question of whether the underlying processors are shared. In fact, in 
previous experiments, both the linguistic and nonlinguistic 
information mapped onto related meanings. Consequently, conceptual 
information derived from linguistic or nonlinguistic sources provided 
a prior context, which might have exerted top-down effects on both 
linguistic and nonlinguistic processes, without these processes being 
shared or identical. As top-down effects have been observed even at 
the level of the thalamus (O’Connor, Fukui, Pinsk & Kastner, 2002), 
such effects could occur at the earliest processing stages. For example, 
in Meteyard et al.’s (2007) studies, participants continuously listened 
to verbs representing a direction of motion at a rate of 1/s; motion was 
displayed only during randomly spaced periods of 150ms. Hence, 
listening to upward or downward verbs might have placed participants 
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in upward or downward “mind-sets,” where thinking about upward 
and downward motion might have influenced their motion perception. 
To test the interdependence of linguistic and nonlinguistic processes, 
one needs, therefore, to use a situation where top-down effects are 
precluded, and where one kind of process cannot establish a prior 
context for the other one.  
In the following experiments, we probe the relation between 
language and nonlinguistic concepts at the earliest processing stages. 
We preclude top-down effects by having both kinds of information 
processed simultaneously and under time pressure, and by having the 
two kinds of processes analyze information that is largely unrelated. 
In each trial, participants viewed a sequence of six unrelated scenes 
presented at a rate of 200ms or 250ms per scene (see Figure 1). 
Observers can encode visual scenes presented at this rate at a rather 
abstract conceptual level. Not only do they succeed on recognition 
tests of the scenes (Potter, Staub, Rado, & O’Connor, 2002), but they 
succeed even when tested on verbal labels for the scenes; for example, 
they can decide whether they have seen a scene corresponding to the 
description “people in street” (Potter, Staub, & O’Connor, 2004). In 
other words, people extract not only low-level visual information as in 
traditional visual short-term memory studies, but also the conceptual 
gist of the scenes (e.g., Intraub, 1981; Potter, 1976). 
After having seen the six rapidly presented scenes, participants 
completed a yes-no recognition test. In a random half of the trials, 
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participants were shown 10 scenes one at a time (half had appeared in 
the sequence, and half were new). In the remaining trials, participants 
were shown 10 verbal labels for scenes (half corresponding to the 
scenes they had seen, half new), and had to decide whether they had 
seen a scene corresponding to the labels.  
In Experiment 1, we establish that observers can extract the gist 
of scenes at a rate of 200ms/picture, as in previous experiments 
investigating conceptual short-term memory (Potter et al., 2002, 
2004). In Experiment 2, we test whether a linguistic secondary task 
interferes with scene memory. Specifically, a written word was 
presented in the center of each scene, the sequence of six words 
forming a sentence that was syntactically acceptable but made little 
sense, such as “miners duly locate truly tired ladies.” Such sentences 
are likely to trigger linguistic processing as shown in earlier studies 
using RSVP sentences, where words were presented one by one at 
rates of up to 12 words/s (Potter, Kroll, & Harris, 1980; Potter & 
Lombardi, 1990). Following each sequence, participants were either 
tested on their memory for the scenes or for the sentence. 
In Experiment 3, we ask whether a nonlinguistic secondary task 
interferes with scene memory. The center of each scene contained a 
small box with grid lines. Participants were instructed to press a key 
when they detected a change in the density of the grid lines. The box 
was shown in Experiment 1 as well, but participants were simply told 
to look at it. Experiment 4 replicates Experiment 2, but using 
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semantically more sensible sentences; Experiments 5a and 5b provide 
additional controls.  
General method  
Participants 
Ninety-six native speakers of English (55 women, 41 men, 
mean age 23.3) from the MIT community were included in the 
analyses of the primary task of each of Experiments 1 to 5b (16 per 
experiment). No participant took part in more than one experiment 
reported here. 
Stimuli 
As described in Potter et al. (2004), scenes were colored 
photographs collected from the World Wide Web and commercial 
sources, and the labels corresponding to the pictures were generated 
by two research assistants. Scenes (and the corresponding labels) were 
randomly organized into sets of 11 pictures (6 RSVP items and 5 
“new” items), with the constraint that the items in a set had no 
obvious relation to each other. 
The box at the center of the pictures in Experiments 1 and 3 had 
a size of 35×35 pixels, and contained equally spaced horizontal and 
vertical gridlines. The box appeared in synchrony with the scenes. The 
line density changed equally often on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th scene, 
changing back to the original density on the following scene.  
Sentences in Experiment 2 were composed according to 10 
different grammatical templates by drawing quasi-randomly from lists 
Independence of early conceptual and linguistic processes 
8 
of words in the relevant form classes (nouns, verbs, adverbs, 
adjectives, and some prepositions) and made little sense. Words were 
reasonably frequent and had 2 syllables and 4 to 6 letters. Words in 
change trials were selected using the same criteria.  In Experiment 4 
the sentences were more meaningful; the only constraints imposed on 
the words were to be reasonably frequent and to have at most 8 letters.  
Procedure 
Each experiment comprised 80 trials. Trials started with a 
central fixation cross, followed by 6 visual scenes (200ms per scene). 
In Experiments 1 and 3, the center of the scenes contained the small 
box with grid lines. In Experiment 1, participants were instructed to 
look at the box, and to remember the scenes. In Experiment 3, 
participants were instructed to press a key when they detected a 
change of the density of the lines inside the box. Before starting the 
experiment, participants received four practice trials where only the 
small box was presented, without any scenes.  
Following the 6 scenes, participants were tested for their 
recognition memory. In a random half of the trials, participants were 
tested on visual scenes; in the remaining trials, they were tested on 
labels for the scenes. The sixth scene was never tested because it was 
unmasked and therefore easily remembered (Potter et al., 2002). 
Participants were tested on 10 items (scenes or labels), half of which 
had appeared in the scene sequence, and half of which were new. No 
picture occurred in more than one trial. Responses were collected 
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from pre-marked “Yes” and “No” keys on the keyboard. Participants 
received four practice trials before starting the experiment. 
In Experiment 2 and 4, the squares in the center of the scenes 
were replaced by a box in which each word of a six word sentence 
was presented, word by word, synchronized with the onset of the 
scenes.  
In half of the trials of Experiments 2 and 4, participants were 
tested on their memory for the sentences; they saw an entire sentence 
on the screen, and had to decide whether or not a word had been 
changed; on half of these trials, one word was replaced by a new 
word, preserving grammaticality. In the remaining trials, participants 
were tested on their recognition of scenes and scene labels as in 
Experiments 1 and 3. 
To analyze an equal number of scene test trials in Experiments 
1--4, we considered only those trials in Experiment 1 and 3 in which 
the line density of the square in the center of the scenes did not 
change. Data were analyzed in terms of five relative test positions of 
the five old pictures, matched with the five distractor pictures (rather 
than the 10 absolute test positions), using a repeated-measures 
ANOVA with the within-subject predictors relative test position and 
test modality (scene vs. scene label). 
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Experiment 1 
Results and discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 are shown in Figure 2a and Table 
1. Participants successfully remembered scenes. In this and all other 
experiments, they performed better when tested on scenes than when 
tested on labels, presumably because scenes provide participants with 
visual and conceptual information in addition to the gist of the scenes 
(the only information carried by the labels). Replicating earlier work 
(Potter et al., 2002, 2004), participants performed worse in later test 
positions, probably due to decay or interference; this was the case in 
all other experiments as well. However, both when tested on scenes 
and on scene labels, participants performed significantly above chance 
in all positions, again in this and all other experiments. As Figures 2 
and 4a and Tables 1 show, analogous effects of the test modality and 
position were observed in each of the other experiments, but will not 
be reported in the text. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 addresses the question of how linguistic and 
conceptual mechanisms interact at early processing stages by 
presenting a word in the center of each scene. The six words formed a 
sentence that was syntactically acceptable but made little sense, such 
as “miners duly locate truly tired ladies.” For a random half of the 
trials, participants were tested on scenes or scene labels. In the other 
trials, participants were tested on their memory for the sentences.  
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If scene understanding involves linguistic resources, we would 
expect a large decrement in scene memory between Experiments 1 
and 2. In contrast, if we grasp the conceptual meaning of scenes by 
virtue of nonlinguistic mechanisms, we would expect only a limited 
decrease in scene memory due to the attentional demands of 
performing two tasks simultaneously, or even no decrease at all.  
Results and discussion 
In the secondary task in Experiment 2, participants successfully 
detected changed words (Figure 3 and Table 2). Scene recognition 
performance is shown in Figure 2b, and was compared between 
Experiments 1 and 2 using a logistic mixed-effects model (Table 3). 
While there was no main effect of Experiment, participants performed 
numerically better in Experiment 2 despite their secondary task. Scene 
recognition performance was better for scenes and for earlier test 
positions, and the separation between the two test modalities 
diminished for later test positions. As shown in Table 3, analogous 
effects of the test modality and position were observed in each of the 
other between-experiment comparisons, but will not be reported in the 
text.1 
Compared to Experiment 1, Experiment 2 not only revealed no 
decrease in performance: participants performed numerically (if not 
significantly) better than in Experiment 1, even though they had to 
read sentences in addition to monitoring the scenes. While previous 
research has shown that, at least after massive training, some types of 
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natural scene processing can occur with very limited attentional 
involvement (Li, VanRullen, Koch, & Perona, 2002; Fei-Fei, 
VanRullen, Koch, & Perona, 2005; but see Yi, Woodman, Widders, 
Marois, & Chun, 2004), one would expect performance in Experiment 
2 to be worse than in Experiment 1, simply because participants had 
to complete two tasks rather than one. However, if scene 
understanding and language rely on disjoint sets of processes, 
participants might complete both tasks, without any detrimental effect 
of one task on the other.  
In Experiment 3, we further explored the question of why scene 
understanding was not impaired by the linguistic secondary task of 
Experiment 2. As in Experiment 2, participants completed a 
secondary task; in contrast to Experiment 2, however, this task was 
nonlinguistic in nature. If scene understanding is simply unaffected by 
secondary tasks, we would expect to replicate the results of 
Experiment 2, observing no impairment in scene recognition. In 
contrast, scene recognition performance might be affected by 
nonlinguistic secondary tasks that tap into processes required for 
scene understanding (e.g., visual processing), even if scene 
recognition performance is not affected by linguistic secondary tasks.  
Experiment 3 
Participants were presented with rapid sequences of 6 scenes. 
As in Experiment 1, the center of each scene contained a small box 
with grid lines. Participants were instructed to press a key when they 
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detected a change in the density of the grid lines. Recognition of the 
scenes was tested as before. 
Results and discussion 
In the secondary task in Experiment 3, participants detected 
density changes in the small box (Figure 3 and Table 2); this 
performance did not differ from that on the secondary task in 
Experiment 2, F(1,35)=2.3, p=.137, η2=.062, although the sentence 
task in Experiment 2 was numerically harder.  
Scene recognition performance is shown in Figure 2c, and was 
compared between Experiments 1 and 3 using a logistic mixed-effects 
model (Table 3). Unsurprisingly, given that participants had to 
perform a secondary task in Experiment 3 but not in Experiment 1, 
participants performed worse in Experiment 3 than in Experiment 1. 
These results contrast with the comparison of Experiments 1 and 2, 
where participants performed numerically (if not significantly) better 
in Experiment 2 although they had to complete a secondary task. We 
surmise that the crucial difference between Experiments 2 and 3 is 
that participants completed a linguistic secondary task in Experiment 
2 and a visual-attention secondary task in Experiment 3, and that some 
mechanisms involved in the visual task, but not language, are needed 
to understand scenes. Accordingly, participants performed 
significantly better in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 3 (Table 3). 
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Experiment 4 
Although the difficulty of the secondary tasks in Experiments 2 
and 3 was matched in terms of task performance (at least when each 
secondary task was presented with the same primary task, 
remembering scenes), participants were significantly better at 
recognizing scenes in Experiment 2 compared to Experiment 3, 
suggesting that language processing is largely independent of scene 
comprehension. It is possible, however, that participants did not fully 
process the nonsense sentences used in Experiment 2. In Experiment 
4, we control for this possibility by replicating Experiment 2, but 
using simple, semantically interpretable six word sentences (e.g., 
“Carol rants about the lousy food”). These more interpretable 
sentences should be more likely to trigger normal sentence processing 
than the less meaningful sentences in Experiment 2. 
Results and discussion 
In the secondary task of Experiment 4, participants successfully 
detected changed words (Table 2). The secondary task performance 
was better than in Experiment 2, F(1,35)=9.1, p=.005, η2=.207, and 
than in Experiment 3, F(1,32)=4.2, p=.049, η2=.116. Scene 
recognition performance in Experiment 4 is shown in Figure 2d, and 
was significantly better than in Experiment 3, but not compared to 
Experiment 2 (Table 3).2 Thus, making the sentences more normal 
and meaningful did not increase interference with picture processing. 
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A plausible conclusion from these data is that linguistic tasks 
involve processes that are independent from those involved in scene 
understanding. Alternatively, such tasks might prevent 
counterproductive verbal strategies that participants might use to 
remember the scenes. Participants sometimes report trying to find 
labels for the scenes, thereby occupying resources that would no 
longer be available to encode the scenes. A similar observation has 
been made in experiments where participants had to keep faces or 
colors in long-term memory; when instructed to verbally describe the 
face or the color during a retention period of several minutes, their 
recognition performance was substantially impaired compared to 
various control tasks that did not involve verbalization of the stimuli 
(Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). Similarly, a secondary 
language task of the sort used in Experiments 2 and 4 might inhibit 
counterproductive verbal strategies, whereas a nonlinguistic 
secondary task would show the usual negative effect of having a 
secondary task.  
Preventing verbal strategies might, therefore, offset the 
attentional costs associated with performing a secondary task. 
However, Experiments 1 to 4 might have encouraged such strategies, 
because participants were tested not only on actual visual scenes, but 
also on verbal labels for the scenes. Possibly, a linguistic secondary 
task might reveal interference with scene understanding if 
participants’ performance on scenes had been tested only with actual 
Independence of early conceptual and linguistic processes 
16 
scenes, but not with verbal labels. We tested this possibility in 
Experiments 5a and 5b. 
Experiment 5 
 Experiments 5a and 5b are replications of Experiments 2 and 3, 
respectively, with three crucial changes. First, and most importantly, 
participants were never tested on verbal labels for the scenes, but only 
on actual visual scenes. As a result, the test items should no longer 
encourage a verbal memory strategy for the scenes. Second, we made 
the two secondary tasks more similar. In Experiment 5a, participants 
read the same sentences as in Experiment 2, again presented word by 
word in the center of a scene. In a random half of the trials, 
participants were then tested on single words; that is, they had to 
decide whether or not a test word had occurred in the sentence (on 
half of the trials it had). On the other half of the trials, they were 
tested on scene memory. As in Experiment 3, participants in 
Experiment 5b had to detect changes of the density of lines in a small 
square; however, rather than pressing a key as soon as they saw a 
density change, on half the trials they had to report after the trial 
whether or not a density change had occurred. In the remaining trials 
they were tested on their memory for the scenes. Third, after they had 
completed the experiments, participants were tested on the secondary 
task in isolation, with no primary task and no scenes being shown. In 
addition to these changes, in Experiment 5 we increased the 
presentation duration to 250ms per picture.3 
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Results and discussion 
In the secondary task in Experiment 5a, participants 
successfully discriminated words that had occurred in the sentence 
from words that had not (Table 2 and Figure 4b). (Below, we will 
return to the performance on the secondary task when it was presented 
as the only and primary task.) In the secondary task in Experiment 5b, 
participants detected density changes in the small box (Figure 4b and 
Table 2); this performance did not differ from that on the secondary 
task in Experiment 5a, F(1,32)=.6, p=.447, η2=.018, although the 
sentence task in Experiment 5a was numerically harder.  
Scene recognition performance in Experiments 5a and 5b is 
shown in Figure 4a; the results were compared using a logistic mixed-
effects model. Crucially, and replicating the results of Experiments 2 
and 3, participants performed better in Experiment 5a than in 
Experiment 5b (Table 3), suggesting that the nonlinguistic secondary 
task of Experiment 5b interfered more with scene understanding than 
the linguistic secondary task of Experiment 5a, even though the two 
secondary tasks were equally difficult.  
While the two secondary tasks were matched for difficulty 
when used as secondary tasks, one task might be easier than the other 
when tested in isolation, without a primary task. To address this 
question, participants in Experiments 5a and 5b completed their 
respective secondary tasks without any interfering primary tasks after 
having finished the main experiment. As shown in Figure 4b and 
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Table 2, performance on the linguistic secondary task was similar 
when used as a secondary task and when it was presented in isolation. 
In contrast, performance on the change detection task was almost 
perfect in the absence of interfering scenes. An ANOVA (excluding 
two participants, one in each experiment, who did not complete the 
second presentation of the secondary tasks) with the between-subjects 
predictor task type (nonsense sentences vs. change detection) and the 
within-subject predictor task status (secondary task vs. sole task) 
revealed main effects of both the task type, F(1,30)=4.4, p=.044, 
η2p=.129, and the task status, F(1,30)=29.2, p<.0001, η2p=.438. 
Importantly, we observed an interaction between these factors, 
F(1,30)=7.5, p=.01, η2p=.112. While the performance on the linguistic 
task differed only marginally depending on whether participants had 
to complete a concomitant primary task, F(1,16)=3.9, p=.065, 
η2p=.197, performance on the nonlinguistic secondary task was 
markedly improved when the task was presented in isolation, 
F(1,16)=36.0, p<.0001, η2p=.720. In other words, not only did the 
nonlinguistic secondary task interfere more with scene understanding 
than the linguistic secondary task, but scene understanding also 
interfered more with the nonlinguistic secondary task than with the 
linguistic secondary task. Remarkably, the performance on the 
linguistic secondary task was almost unaffected by concomitant scene 
understanding, while the comparison of Experiments 1 and 2 reveals 
that scene understanding was unaffected by the presence of a 
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linguistic secondary task. Hence, linguistic stimuli seem to be 
processed by mechanisms that are separate from those involved in 
visual scene understanding, even if both the scenes and the linguistic 
stimuli are presented visually. 
General discussion 
In the experiments presented here, we probe the relation 
between language and conceptual processing at the earliest processing 
stages when stimuli are presented for durations of a single fixation. 
Previous research using similar presentation rates has revealed that 
observers extract and retain abstract conceptual information on top of 
visual information (Potter et al., 2004). Using this assay, we show that 
participants’ grasp of the conceptual meaning of scenes is almost 
unaffected by a linguistic secondary task and vice versa, while scene 
understanding and a nonlinguistic secondary task mutually interfere. 
These results are not simply due to the nonlinguistic secondary tasks 
using more visual processing and memory resources, for three 
reasons. First, stimuli for the linguistic secondary task occluded at 
least as much surface area in the scenes as those for the nonlinguistic 
secondary task, and both needed to be processed visually. Second, the 
nonlinguistic secondary task in Experiment 3 did not require any 
visual memory at all, as participants had to react to a stimulus change 
immediately. Third, the processing advantage for scene recognition 
with a linguistic secondary task was maintained even when 
participants were tested on scene labels, which (presumably) rely 
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more on conceptual information than on visual information. Taken 
together, our results thus suggest that the nonlinguistic secondary task 
interferes with processes that are crucial to scene understanding, while 
the linguistic secondary task appears to be essentially irrelevant to 
scene understanding.  
Further, previous results suggest that linguistic and 
nonlinguistic processes can remain independent not only initially, but 
even in complex behaviors such as communication. For example, in 
languages such as English, the canonical word order is subject-verb-
object (e.g., Mary sees John), while languages such as Turkish have 
the word order subject-object-verb (e.g., Mary John sees). However, 
when people have to gesture events (rather than to encode them 
verbally), they use the subject-object-verb order --- irrespective of the 
word order of their native language (Goldin-Meadow, So, Ozyürek, & 
Mylander, 2008; Langus & Nespor, 2010)---suggesting that the 
linguistic use of concepts and roles such as agents and patients does 
not affect how other processes use the same concepts and roles. 
Despite the intimate link between language and conceptual 
structure, initial linguistic and nonlinguistic processes that derive 
meaning from sensory data thus appear to operate in remarkably 
independent channels. Interactions between linguistic and 
nonlinguistic conceptual processes might reflect top-down effects, 
occurring only if one set of processes establishes a prior context that is 
relevant to the other set of processes. For example, when listening to 
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verbs describing upward motion, observers might be impaired in 
detecting actual downward motion (e.g., Meteyard, Bahrami, & 
Vigliocco, 2007) because listening to upward motion verbs might 
activate conceptual representations that exert top-down influences on 
motion perception, even though the processes used to understand 
verbs and to perceive motion are distinct and independent from one 
another. In the absence of such top-down effects, linguistic stimuli 
appear to be analyzed by dedicated linguistic processors at the earliest 
processing stages, providing further evidence for the remarkable 
modularity of processes that analyze different aspects of our 
environment. 
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Footnotes
                                           
1
 The effects of test position and modality were more pronounced in some experiments 
than others (see Table 3), but these differences are not relevant to the main questions addressed 
here. 
2
 Compared to Experiment 2, the effect of test modality was somewhat more pronounced 
in Experiment 4, and that of test position somewhat less pronounced. While multiple factors might 
have contributed to these differences (e.g., the difficulty of the secondary tasks, the use of 
everyday meanings in Experiment 4 and so on), we note that Experiment 2 and 4 both replicate 
our crucial result that scene recognition is better with a linguistic secondary task compared to a 
non-linguistic secondary task.  
3
 In Experiment 5a we used the nonsense sentences from Experiment 2 rather than the 
more sensible sentences from Experiment 4 because this allowed us to equate the task difficulty 
between the linguistic and the non-linguistic secondary task. Further, we increased the 
presentation duration to 250ms to vary the stimulus parameters. 
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Table 1 
Results of repeated-measures ANOVAs on scene recognition performance with the 
within-subject predictors relative test position and test modality (scene vs. scene label). 
Data were analyzed in terms of five relative test positions of the five old pictures, 
matched with the five distractor pictures (rather than the 10 absolute test positions). In 
Experiments 5a and 5b, participants were tested on scenes but not on scene labels. 
 
    Experimenta 
  1 2 3  4 5a 5b  
Test position F(4,60) 11.1 15.7 6.4 5.2  22.1 4.2 
 p <.0001 <.0001 < .0002 .001 <.0001 .005 
 η2p .426 .511 .299 .257 .595 .219 
Test modality F(1,15)  19.3 14.8 12.5 20.7 NA NA 
 p .0005 .002 .003 .0004 
 η2p .563 .496 .454 .58 
Interaction F(4,60) ns ns 2.55 2.6 NA NA 
 p   .048 .045 
 η2p   .145 .148 
a
 In Experiments 2 to 5, a total of eight additional participants were excluded from the analyses of the 
primary task because their performance on the secondary task did not differ from chance by a one-tailed 
binomial test; as a result, the remaining participants were guaranteed to have paid attention to the secondary 
task. (The pattern of results is qualitatively unchanged if these participants are included.) 
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Table 2 
Percentage of correct responses in the secondary tasks and associated t-tests against the 
chance level of 50% in the different experiments. In Experiments 5a and 5b, the 
secondary tasks where performed once as secondary task, and once as sole task without 
any additional task. 
 
   Experiment 
    As secondary task As sole task 
 2 3 4 5a 5b 5a 5b 
M  72.0% 78.2% 85.3% 83.3% 86.4% 86.8% 98.5% 
SD 14.7% 8.6% 11.5% 13.6% 8.8% 14.2% 1.8% 
t 6.7  13.5 12.6 10.4 16.5 10.7 102.0 
df 19 16 16 17 15 16 14 
p <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Cohen’s d  1.5 3.3 3.1 2.4 4.1 2.6 26.0 
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Table 3 
Scene recognition performance in the different experiments was compared using a 
logistic mixed-effects model (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Pinheiro & Bates, 
2000). We started with the following fixed effect predictors: secondary task (i.e., 
experiment), test modality (scene vs. scene label), absolute test position, all interactions 
between these predictors. The initial model included the following random effect 
predictors: intercept adjustments for participants, trial number, test item; slope adjustment 
for test items relative to the slope of the test modality predictor. The final model included 
only those (fixed and random effect) predictors that contributed significantly to the 
likelihood of the model. 
 
   Comparison between experimentsa 
  1 vs. 2 1 vs. 3 2 vs. 3 2 vs. 4 3 vs. 4 5a vs. 5b 
Experiment Z  ns 2.0 2.8 ns 2.4 2.9 
 p  .044 .005  .016 .003 
Test position Z -9.2 -9.6 -10.8 -13.1 -12.2 -4.0 
 P .0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Test modality Z 6.4 7.7 6.7 6.0 7.1 NA 
 p <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 NA 
Experiment × Z -2.7 ns -2.6  2.0 ns ns 
   test position p .007  .008 .048 
Experiment × Z ns  ns  ns 2.4 2.5 NA 
   test modality p    .014 .011  NA 
Test position × Z 2.2 3.4 3.7 3.8 4.7 NA 
   test modality p .026 .0006 .0003 .0001 .0001 NA 
a
 The exclusion criteria in Experiments 2 to 5 are given in Table 1. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1:  Paradigm used in all experiments. (left) In each trial, 
participants saw a sequence of scenes at a rate of 200ms per scene, 
following a fixation cross. In Experiments 1 and 3, the center of each 
scene presented a small box with gridlines. In Experiment 1, 
participants were instructed to look at the box; in Experiment 3, they 
had to detect changes in the gridline density. (right) Following the 
rapidly presented scenes, participants completed a recognition test 
with 10 items (5 new, 5 old). In half of the scene recognition trials, 
they were tested on the scenes; in the other scene recognition trials, 
they were tested on labels corresponding to the scenes. In 
Experiments 2 and 4, the boxes were replaced by 6 words forming a 
sentence, presented word by word, synchronized with the onset of the 
scenes; participants were instructed to remember the sentence. On half 
the trials they were tested on the pictures, and on the other half on the 
sentences. Experiments 5a and 5b were similar to Experiments 2 and 
3, except that participants were never tested on scene labels. 
Figure 2:  Percentage of correct responses when participants were 
tested on scenes (solid lines) or verbal scene labels (dashed lines) as a 
function of the relative test position. Error bars represent SEM. 
Figure 3:  Performance in the secondary tasks in Experiment 2 to 4. 
Dots represent participants, the diamonds the sample averages, the 
dotted line the sample chance level of 50%, and the dashed line the 
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chance level of individual participants of 65% (as determined by a 
one-tailed binomial test). 
Figure 4:  Results of Experiments 5a and 5b. (a) Percentage of correct 
responses as a function of the relative test position when the 
secondary task was to read sentences (dotted line) or to detect a 
density change (dot-dash line). In contrast to Experiments 1 to 4, 
participants were tested only on scenes, and not on scene labels. Error 
bars represent SEM. (b) Performance in the secondary tasks, when 
tested with a primary task and in the absence of a primary task, 
respectively. Dots represent participants, the diamonds the sample 
averages, the dotted line the sample chance level of 50%, and the 
dashed line the chance level of individual participants of 65% (as 
determined by a one-tailed binomial test). 
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Supplementary materials 
Table S1 
The “hit rate” for scene recognition performance in the different experiments was 
compared using a logistic mixed-effects model (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; 
Pinheiro & Bates, 2000). We started with the following fixed effect predictors: secondary 
task (i.e., experiment), test modality (scene vs. scene label), absolute test position, all 
interactions between these predictors. The initial model included the following random 
effect predictors: intercept adjustments for participants, trial number, test item; slope 
adjustment for test items relative to the slope of the test modality predictor. The final 
model included only those (fixed and random effect) predictors that contributed 
significantly to the likelihood of the model. 
   Comparison between experiments (hit rate)a 
  1 vs. 2 1 vs. 3 2 vs. 3 2 vs. 4 3 vs. 4 5a vs. 5b 
Experiment Z 3.3 ns 4.0 ns 3.6 ns 
 p .001  <.0001  .0004  
Test position Z -8.2 -8.3 -10.9 -15.2 -14.5 -12.5 
 P <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Test modality Z 4.0 ns 4.4 5.1 4.3 NA 
 p <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  
Experiment × Z 6.1 ns 4.1 3.9 ns ns 
   test position p <.0001  <.0001 <.0001   
Experiment × Z ns ns ns ns 2.2 NA 
   test modality p     .025  
Test position × Z 3.1 ns 5.1 4.8 6.2 NA 
   test modality p .002  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  
a
 The exclusion criteria in Experiments 2 to 5 are given in Table 1. 
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Table S2 
The “correct rejection” rate for scene recognition performance in the different 
experiments was compared using a logistic mixed-effects model (Baayen, Davidson, & 
Bates, 2008; Pinheiro & Bates, 2000). We started with the following fixed effect 
predictors: secondary task (i.e., experiment), test modality (scene vs. scene label), 
absolute test position, all interactions between these predictors. The initial model 
included the following random effect predictors: intercept adjustments for participants, 
trial number, test item; slope adjustment for test items relative to the slope of the test 
modality predictor. The final model included only those (fixed and random effect) 
predictors that contributed significantly to the likelihood of the model. 
   Comparison between experiments (correct rejections)a 
  1 vs. 2 1 vs. 3 2 vs. 3 2 vs. 4 3 vs. 4 5a vs. 5b 
Experiment Z -3.4 ns -2.9 ns -3.1 2.7 
 p .0006  .004  .002 .007 
Test position Z 2.6 2.8 6.8 5.7 5.5 11.8 
 p .008 .005 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Test modality Z ns 2.5 2.3 ns 2.5 NA 
 p  .011 .022  .013  
Experiment × Z 3.0 2.3 ns ns ns ns 
   test position p .003 .021     
Experiment × Z ns ns 3.5 2.1 ns NA 
   test modality p   .0004 .032   
Test position × Z 2.9 2.9 4.5 3.0 3.1 NA 
   test modality p .004 .004 <.0001 .003 .002  
a
 The exclusion criteria in Experiments 2 to 5 are given in Table 1. 
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Figure S3 
Results of the primary tasks of Experiments 1 to 4 in terms of hit rats and false 
alarm rates. Error bars represent SEM. 
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Figure S4 
Hit rates and false alarm rates in the secondary tasks in Experiment 2 to 4. Bars 
represent the sample averages; error bars represent SEM. 
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Figure S5 
Results of Experiments 5a and 5b. (a) Hit rates and false alarm rates in the 
primary, scene recognition task. Error bars represent SEM. (b) Hit rates and false 
alarm rates in the secondary tasks, when tested with a primary task and in the 
absence of a primary task, respectively. Bars represent the sample averages; error 
bars represent SEM. 
 
